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WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF JV2010, IS THERE A REQUIREMENT FOR A THEATER-LEVEL JOINT FORCES LOGISTICS COMMANDER (JFLOGC) AND A JOINT THEATER LOGISTICS COMMAND (JTLC)?

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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15.Abstract: As current Joint Vision 2010 (JV2010) concepts become reality, their affects on joint theater (operational) logistics will have significant consequences on traditional Service logistics functions and organizations. Redundant Service logistics functions and personnel must be eliminated to reduce the logistics "footprint". These smaller logistics forces will have to provide precise support in a high-speed, fluid environment dominated by maneuver, lethality and information. Joint theater logisticians will have to support not only U.S. personnel but those of its multinational coalition partners and civilian organizations. These logisticians must provide this support over a wide spectrum of contingencies. The efficiency and effectiveness required by future CINCs cannot be provided by the current ad hoc method of organizing U.S. logistical efforts. The CINC must have a single commander he can turn to for providing all the logistics support required. That commander, a senior logistician, must have the authority commensurate with the responsibility and must also have a joint theater logistics organization manned by highly trained logisticians armed with sophisticated logistics C2 and information systems and available to meet the combat force's needs. That individual is the Joint Force Logistics Commander (JFLOGC) and that organization is the Joint Theater Logistics Command (JTLC). Currently, neither exists, however, the Army's proposed Theater Support Command (TSC) could provide them. With minimal augmentation, the TSC becomes the ideal organization to manage theater-level common logistics support for all U.S. forces and coalition partners (IAW applicable agreements).

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ABSTRACT

As current Joint Vision 2010 (JV2010) concepts become reality, their affects on joint theater (operational) logistics will have significant consequences on traditional Service logistics functions and organizations. Redundant Service logistics functions and personnel must be eliminated to reduce the logistics "footprint". These smaller logistics forces will have to provide precise support in a high-speed, fluid environment dominated by maneuver, lethality and information. Joint theater logisticians will have to support not only U.S. personnel but those of its multinational coalition partners and civilian organizations. These logisticians must provide this support over a wide spectrum of contingencies. The efficiency and effectiveness required by future CINCs cannot be provided by the current ad hoc method of organizing U.S. logistical efforts. The CINC must have a single commander he can turn to for providing all the logistics support required. That commander, a senior logistician, must have the authority commensurate with the responsibility and must also have a joint theater logistics organization manned by highly trained logisticians armed with sophisticated logistics C2 and information systems and available to meet the combat force's needs. That individual is the Joint Force Logistics Commander (JFLOGC) and that organization is the Joint Theater Logistics Command (JTLC). Currently, neither exists. There is, however, a proposed organization that could provide the CINC both, the Army's Theater Support Command (TSC). The Army, based upon its experiences and lessons learned from the Gulf War and recent contingencies, has included new doctrinal and organizational concepts into the TSC to meet its Army theater logistics responsibilities.

With augmentation from the other Services, the TSC becomes the ideal organization to manage theater-level common logistics support for all U.S. forces and coalition partners (IAW applicable agreements). The TSC commander, envisioned to be a MGEN or LGEN with extensive logistics experience, naturally assumes the position of JFLOGC. While the TSC provides the foundation for a JTLC and its commander meets the requirements of the JFLOGC, both have some shortfalls. The advantages offered by the TSC and its commander far outweigh their problems. The opportunity for adapting the TSC into a JTLC and utilize its commander as the JFLOGC currently exists. Their adoption rests upon senior military leadership.

Thesis. Theater CINCs must be able to turn to a single individual and know this person and their organization can provide all the logistics support he needs to successfully complete his mission. Today, there is no single individual or organization within a theater of operations to which a CINC may turn. Any theater-level logistics organization, if made available to a CINC, is ad-hoc in nature; its quality and effectiveness is suspect. The need exists now for a Joint Theater Logistics Command (JTLC) led by a Joint Force Logistics Commander (JFLOGC). By 2010, few, if any, operations may be possible without them.

Current Joint Vision 2010 (JV2010) concepts will become realities as the U.S. armed forces move into the 21st century. These new realities will affect future logistics operations, particularly in regards to joint theater (operational) support. Future joint operations will require a smaller, yet more efficient, cohesive logistics structure capable of providing precise support in a high operational tempo, fluid, information-dominated environment covering a broad spectrum of contingencies. This logistics structure must also be able to interact with a number of multinational or coalition partners and civilian organizations. This structure can no longer be made up of the individual Services' logistics activities providing common support to their own units and personnel. These activities must be consolidated under a single theater-level logistics organization (JTLC), manned by experts armed with an efficient command and control network, and led by a senior logistician (JFLOGC).

First, this paper will briefly outline the affects of JV2010 on future joint logistics requirements, current JCS guidance on joint logistics, and future Service joint logistics concepts and programs. Then, after a sufficient review of past and present operational

logistic practices, it will provide the rationale for a Joint Force Logistics Commander and Joint Theater Logistics Command. It will conclude by recommending an organization to fulfill these requirements.

JV2010 and Future Joint Logistics Requirements.[1]

As General Sheehan aptly stated in his article[2]:

"To achieve JV2010 – the Chairman's conceptual template for how the military will channel resources and leverage technology for greater joint effectiveness – we must be able to conduct coherent joint operations. CINCs must be able to integrate service capabilities to achieve common tactical and operational objectives."

Joint Vision 2010 predicts rapid power projection coupled with some degree of overseas presence and multinational participation, will likely remain the fundamental U.S. strategic military concept. Military operations will require U.S. forces become fully joint: institutionally, organizationally, intellectually and technically. The Services will seamlessly integrate their capabilities. Improved precision, reduced force size, and increased lethality and stealth will all lead to higher tempo operations and widely dispersed forces. Forces will transition more rapidly from deployment to fully operational employment. Mass will be replaced by highly maneuverable forces, attacking targets concurrently rather than sequentially, creating a fluid, non-linear battlespace. This battlespace will be "managed" by the fusion of all-source intelligence, integrating sensors, platforms and command organizations to allow the accomplishment of a greater number of synchronized operational tasks over a shorter period of time. Speed will dominate all aspects of tomorrow's military operations.

What does this portend for future logistics? Rapid deployment of smaller forces requires a smaller initial logistics footprint that will be tested very early as these forces transition directly from deployment into the execution phase. There will be little time to

build up logistics support as deployed logisticians immediately progress into sustaining the force. Maneuverability and dispersion will require a combination theater supply-transportation (distribution) system to obtain, track, reroute and quickly deliver tailored sustainment packages directly from the supplier to the warfighter (e.g. "factory to foxhole" or "factory to flightline"). Commonality and interoperability among the Services and allies, coupled with increased resource constraints, will require a greater interchange of assets to achieve the CINC's objectives. Responsiveness, flexibility, creativity, resiliency, and precision, enabled by the fusion of information, logistics, and transportation technologies, will characterize tomorrow's joint theater support systems. Manning for these systems will be provided by modular, specifically tailored force packages, relying on an increasing number of Reserve Component personnel. Deployed U.S. forces will be highly dependent upon host nation support due to a smaller logistics "tail" and the need to husband valuable lift while, simultaneously, supporting multinational partners to maintain coalition cohesion.

Current JCS Guidance on Joint Logistics (See Appendix A).

Joint doctrine supports the establishment of a joint logistics organization, the JTLC, under the direction of a single command authority, the JFLOGC. The four operational/tactical level logistics problems alluded to in Joint Publication 4-0 can be overcome through effective JLTC management policies and procedures.

JV2010 and Service Joint Logistics Concepts and Programs.

"JV2010 is a broad statement of operational concepts allowing the Services a wide range of latitude in translating these concepts into capabilities. Service capabilities must compliment each other and be fully interoperable." [3]

Each Service has developed its own vision of its future based upon JV2010 constructs. The Army has *Force XXI*, the Air Force, *Global Engagement*, the Navy has

Forward...from the Sea and the Marines, *Operational Maneuver from the Sea*. Each Service has also developed future logistics concepts and programs to meet the needs of 21st Century operations. The following is a brief synopsis of the Services' future logistics concepts and programs as they affect military operations conducted by a Joint Force Commander.

Force XXI. The Army, more than any other Service, has developed the most complete doctrinal and organizational logistics concepts and programs to support its future. There are two essential drivers providing impetus to these developments. The first is lessons learned from Desert Shield/Storm and post-Gulf War contingencies[4]. In the Gulf, the Army violated its own doctrine by not employing a Logistics C2 structure to accomplish theater-level support, even though it possessed such an organization, the Theater Army Area Command (TAACOM). By not activating a TAACOM, the Army intentionally created an ad-hoc Logistics C2 organization, the 21st Support Command (SUPCOM) led by LGEN Gus Pagonis. The problems confronted by the general and his unit are too numerous to detail, but these three have drawn the most attention: 1) The lack of asset visibility; 2) The need for early deployment of theater logisticians to establish procedures and clear sea and aerial ports of debarkation (S/APODs); and 3) The need for an organization to maintain the "total requirements" versus "capabilities" picture to deconflict priorities and provide resources IAW higher headquarters guidance. The Army experienced similar logistics "ad-hocary" in Somalia (1993-4), Rwanda (1994), Kuwait (1994), and continuously in Haiti and Bosnia[5]. The second factor driving the Army is its Title 10 executive agent responsibilities[6]. Title 10 directs the Army to provide support for all in-theater Services, to include (but not limited to): Inland Class I

support, intermodal container management, common user in-theater land transportation, land base water resources, overland POL support, and single manager for conventional ammunition.

The Army's Combined Arms Support Command (CASCOM) and Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) are trying to overcome these problems by developing new organizational and doctrinal concepts and creating the Theater Support Command (TSC) to provide all Logistics C2 for echelons above corps (EAC). The TSC replaces the TAACOM and Theater Army Materiel Management Center (TAMMC), eliminates logistics stovepipes, places most support and centralizes Army Logistics C2 under a single theater logistics HQ. It was organized to leverage the benefits of the Army's new Theater Distribution concept. The TSC will support JV2010's *Focused Logistics* as the battlefield supply concept changes from forward based to precision distribution-based systems.

Global Engagement. Of all the Services, the Air Force has accomplished the least in developing new logistics doctrine and organizations in support of JV2010. This is no doubt due to its recent development of its Aerospace Expeditionary Force (AEF) concept. The logistics concept of operations (CONOPS) is being written by the Air Force Logistics Management Agency (AFLMA) and will not be tested until Expeditionary Force Experiment (EFX) 2000[7]. Of the six core competencies underlying *Global Engagement*, Agile Combat Support best describes the logistics CONOPS for AEF[8]. The Air Force will rely upon time-definite resupply and expedient delivery (AKA "Just-in-Time Logistics") as a means to reduce lift requirements. Resupply will begin as soon as forces arrive in theater. The Air Force will be in the best position to employ a "factory-

to-flightline (or foxhole)" resupply-distribution concept as it can fly its assets directly from suppliers to users at fixed airfields. Operational sustainment will transition from the current "push" method to one based on accurate information, responsive production and daily, time-definite delivery. Air Force leaders envision a Logistics C2 system capable of providing real-time visibility, "reachback", and control of all resources in order to plan, prepare, deploy, employ, sustain, and reconstitute forces across a full spectrum of military operations[9]. The Air Force, as the major provider of airlift, will also join with the Army to form and operate the Theater Distribution System of the future.

Forward...From the Sea and Operational Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS). These two concepts map the course for Naval forces as they complete their transition from a "blue water" to a littoral force early next century. As these concepts are inseparable, so too is their concept for logistics support, Seabased Logistics[10]. It will operate under the tenets of sea base primacy (similar to air supremacy), demand reduction, in-stride sustainment, adaptive response, support joint operations, and the ability to close and reconstitute forces at sea. Seabased Logistics is a means to support littoral power projection from over the horizon, independent of sovereignty restrictions and overseas basing requirements. It will allow the Marines to realize their vision of *OMFTS* and *Ship to Objective Maneuver (STOM)* by increasing logistics reach and optempo and decreasing response time, thus making significant contributions to the primary attributes of maneuver warfare, speed and agility. Ships will be employed as floating distribution centers with organizational and intermediate level maintenance workshops, providing indefinite sustainment and reducing the on-shore logistics footprint. Inland forces will be sustained through aerial delivery or the more traditional logistics-over-the-shore (LOTS)

method, both of which can be integrated into a joint Theater Distribution System. In fact, all aspects of logistics support, resupply, maintenance, distribution, sustainment, and other services provided by Seabased Logistics, can be incorporated into a joint theater logistics system. Seabased Logistics can be sequenced to close with various types of Naval forces (CVBG, ARG, etc) and afloat prepositioned equipment (MPF) as required to accomplish the mission. Since logistics support will maneuver with the supported forces, whether on land or at sea, Naval forces will possess the capability to rapidly reconstitute at sea and redeploy forces for follow-on missions. Seabased Logistics C2 will be part of the Naval forces' operational C2 process without requiring additional organizations. Its Logistics C2 system will allow real-time monitoring of resource usage, forecast demand and assist in pre-planning further resupply operations. This Logistics C2 system will fully integrate into a joint theater Logistics C2 network through the Global Combat Support System (GCSS)[11].

Will A Theater CINC Need A Joint Force Logistics Commander And Joint Theater Logistics Command in 2010?

"Logistics make up as much as nine-tenths of the business of war" [12] Dr. Martin van Creveld.

Theater CINCs will need both a JFLOGC and JTLC if they are to realize the Chairman's JV2010 vision. Current JCS guidance on joint logistics requirements, C2 and organization allows for both. Additionally, the DOD's continuous migration towards joint logistics programs and functions supports these requirements. The evidence clearly points towards the need for a JTLC commanded by a JFLOGC.

Why He Will Need A JFLOGC. Dr. van Creveld's above quote says it all. The job of managing theater logistics is too big and complicated to be left entirely to the CINC. He has too many other duties and responsibilities related to the prosecution of joint

operations. This is one reason why the Joint Publications allow him to delegate this authority to a subordinate commander. He can appoint a JFLOGC, a true logistician, to oversee joint theater logistics requirements just as he is allowed to appoint a JFACC or JFMCC. Airmen learned many years ago that air assets had to be centrally controlled by airmen to gain the maximum benefit from air power. There is no reason to believe this corollary should not apply to logistics. After all, operational logistics is the basis for all combat power. It underwrites the concept of operations and scheme of maneuver and provides the way to structure the battle, campaign or strategic setting[13]. LGEN Pagonis, based upon his Gulf War experience, confirmed the need for a single point of contact in the logistics area as a way to avoid suboptimization[14]. The JFLOGC will be the CINC's POC for common logistics support to all in-theater units, to include multinational coalition members. As the theater's senior logistician, the JFLOGC would be cognizant of the CINC's intent and be ready to support operations with all means available to him.

Another reason the CINC will need a JFLOGC is to separate the function of commanding joint forces from that of supporting them. Both functions require substantially different mindsets[15]. If the CINC performs both functions, he will undoubtedly find his "supported self" in conflict with his "supporting self" (sort of an operations-logistics schizophrenia). Such a dilemma could adversely affect the CINC's thought processes with dire consequences to his forces. Future military operations are likely to be extremely fast and information intense in nature, requiring and allowing split-second decision-making by the CINC. No one person can, or should, be expected to receive, process, and act upon the massive amounts of inputs required to simultaneously lead and support future military forces. Experience has shown military leaders who

neglect their logistics responsibilities (for example: Napoleon's Russian campaign, the Germans in the Battle of the Bulge, the Italian defense of Sicily, etc) usually fail. Logistics (and logisticians!) alone cannot win wars or provide operational success, but it sure can keep you from attaining either.

A third reason for a JFLOGC is political expediency. JV2010 envisions most future operations to be multinational as well as joint. These operations will also require an increasing amount of host nation support[16]. Additionally, as the only nation with global political, military and economic capabilities, the U.S. will be required to provide more support to its allies in order to maintain coalitions. Much of this support will be obtained or provided through intense, personal, time-consuming negotiations between senior U.S. officers and another nation's political, business and military leaders. During the Gulf War, LGEN Pagonis spent much of his time with Saudi Royal family members, military leaders and business owners negotiating or obtaining logistics support[17]. The CINC does not have the time nor should he be expected to secure host nation logistics support for his forces.

Next, the DOD is developing a Logistics C2 system, GCSS, to support force projection in a joint, multinational or inter-agency environment. This system will link all echelons of command to other governmental agencies, allies and commercial vendors to provide real-time CSS data[18]. A command and control system implies there is an element of command with lower elements to control. Since this system ties together diverse Service logistics systems from 13 different disciplines (supply, maintenance, transportation, medical, etc)[19] it will require a command element with a certain degree of logistics expertise. The GCSS is advertised to accelerate delivery of improved combat

support capabilities, gain efficiency and interoperability, facilitate the flow of CSS requirements and synchronization of support activities, and give priority of effort to integrating support with other Services, nations, agencies, and vendors all in support of the warfighter[20]. Such a "system of logistics systems" can only be effectively and efficiently "commanded" by a logistician with years of experience in the various CSS functions (for example: medical, messing, transportation, civil engineering, etc.). This degree of expertise is not resident in a CINC.

Finally, a JTLC must be commanded by a JFLOGC, which leads into the next topic.

Why He Will Need A JTLC.

"By early 21st Century, the Nation will have a joint integrated force that can fully exploit the goals of JV2010." [21]

A primary reason for implementing a JTLC is to eliminate redundant support functions and personnel requirements. This will reduce the number of required logistics personnel and resources (the logistics footprint), saving money and increasing the availability of lift for combat forces. Each Service and command echelon has its own logistics support systems, many of them duplicating each other. Consolidation at the theater level will eliminate much of this duplication and increase the effectiveness and efficiency of operational logistics.

A second reason for a JTLC is to mirror the consolidation of logistics support at the strategic level. For several years, the DOD has been consolidating strategic logistics support by creating or transferring missions to such organizations as USTRANSCOM, DLA, DISA, DFAS, DECA and DFSC. These organizations provide common (joint) logistics support and services to all DOD and many non-DOD governmental agencies[22].

Services are also consolidating their logistics functions. To gain speed, flexibility and maneuverability, the Army's proposed TSC and new *Force XXI* division organizations will place traditional division-level and below logistics functions at the Corps and EAC levels. The Air Force's Air Combat Command (ACC) is also exploring the advantages of combining its wing level Supply, Transportation, and Logistics Plans functions[23]. Similar organizational changes throughout the military will decrease the number of tactical level logisticians, placing an increased burden on operational level functions.

Further consolidation of theater-level logistics functions can be anticipated as more common and interoperable equipment (Joint Tactical Fighter, V-22, C4ISR systems, PGMs, etc) and information systems are introduced into the inventory. A single POC for theater-level logistics, the JTLC, would decrease the duplication in providing common support and services by reducing Service Component stovepipes. The JTLC would also be responsible for prioritized resupply or redistribution of assets between units to overcome shortfalls and meet the CINC's operational requirements. A JTLC-managed theater-level intermediate maintenance capability for these systems may also be necessary for prolonged operations. Finally, as GCSS, JTAV and ITV systems are implemented, the need to oversee the theater's Logistics C2 information flow requires a theater-level management organization.

A JTLC would provide credibility to logistics organizations currently relegated to "second-class" status. Lessons learned from the Gulf War, Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti indicate early entry logisticians, those required to receive, stage, move, and support initial forces, were intentionally removed from the TPFDD flow in favor of more combat forces[24]. As a result, the initial combat forces received substantially less support than

they required, while the SPODs and APODs became choke points in the sustainment flow. These early entry logisticians can also provide "reachback" or "split-base" capabilities with CONUS suppliers should the host nation's economy be too immature or weak to provide necessary support. A formal JTLC, with a modular design, would provide the CINC a capability to build-up logistics forces and resources in concert with his combat forces. A formal organization would also ensure joint logistics forces are not formed ad-hoc, as has been done historically[25].

Under the JV2010 ***Focused Logistics*** pillar[26], our current forward based logistics system will transition to a precision distribution-based system. The 2010 Theater Distribution System will result from the fusion of information, logistics and transportation technologies. It is the premise for reducing the sustainment logistics footprint and response time by replacing mass with precision and velocity providing "factory-to-foxhole" (or "flightline") service. It will be formed primarily from amalgamating the Army's Battlefield Distribution (BD) and Air Force's Air Mobility Express (AMX) concepts[27], but Seabased Logistics will also participate. The 2010 Theater Distribution System will require increased theater-level management to ensure the its effectiveness and efficiency, a job well suited for the JTLC.

Theater logisticians will require a certain amount of guidance and training to meet future theater joint logistics support requirements. Currently, there is a plethora of Service doctrine and training at the strategic and tactical levels, but a dearth of joint and multinational doctrine, guidance and TTPs for operational logistics. Providing this doctrine, guidance, and training is incumbent upon the organization meeting the CINC's needs, in this case the JTLC.

Finally, as civilians (DOD, NGA, contractors and PVO) become more involved with military operations, filling roles previously reserved for military support personnel, there will be a greater need for centralized management (by the JTLC) to coordinate their activities. A good example can be found in Bosnia where the Army's LOGCAP contract with Brown and Root provides messing, sanitary, and billeting facilities and services to U.S. forces in the region. The contractor supplies the personnel and facilities but the Army is required to oversee the contract and operations plus provide security and military communications for contractor personnel[28]. In Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti, the U.S. provided support to civilian and UN relief organizations in addition to supporting its own forces. Operations as diverse and logistically intense as natural disaster or humanitarian relief require close coordination between civilian organizations and U.S. forces at the point of need to ensure any degree of success. This is particularly true when the host nation or local area infrastructure cannot support the relief effort and is, therefore, dependent upon U.S. military support. As the CINC's logistics integrator, the JTLC would be the single POC to meet any logistics requirements the CINC supports.

The JFLOGC and JTLC both provide many benefits to the CINC but their adoption and implementation will not proceed without resistance. First, Service parochialism will not fully support either proposition. This challenge will be the most difficult to overcome. Maintaining their forces is a prime reason for the Services' existence and provides a significant portion of their annual budgets. Perhaps the only way to overcome Service parochialism is through legislation. Second, consolidating logistics support at the theater level may not produce the savings or efficiencies anticipated. The DOD has a long history of implementing programs advertised to save

money or manpower or increase efficiency, only to realize smaller or fewer benefits than promised. Looking at the anticipated versus actual payback from BRAC closures, depot consolidations, and the privatization of military functions, it is difficult to refute this argument[29]. Third, critics will point out that ad-hoc theater logistics organizations (the status quo) have worked in the past, so they may be assumed to work in the future. In the past, the U.S. overcame its organizational problems with "brute force" massed logistics (WWII, Vietnam, Gulf War). That solution may not be available in the future. Fourth, many of the anticipated benefits of the JTLC are based upon Logistics C2 or information systems currently in test or development. If they are not fielded, or are fielded with less than stated requirements, vital JTLC C2 may not be available. Also, C2 systems are vulnerable to Information or C2 warfare (IW/C2W). Fifth, some will argue the CINC already has a JFLOGC and the makings of a JTLC in his J4 staff. The J4 organization is primarily a planning and policy cell and remains so during contingencies. It is not manned for theater-wide logistics functions[30]. Finally, elevating a JFLOGC to the same command level as the JFACC, JFLCC, and JFMCC may be "politically" unacceptable to the military hierarchy. This is more a problem of perception (operator Vs. supporter) than of fact, but it persists in every military organization.

How Does He Get From Here to There? Creating a new theater-level logistics organization is not an option in this age of force reductions (a zero-sum game concerning manpower). Therefore, CINCs must look at existing or future organizations that may provide the necessary logistics functions with minimal alterations. There is a proposed organization that, with augmentation from the other Services, could convert into a JTLC and provide the JFLOGC, the Army's Theater Support Command.

Why choose the Army's organization over the Air Force or Naval organizations? First, the Air Force does not have, nor is likely to develop, a logistics organization capable of supporting theater-level logistics on the scale required. Its logistics focus is on aircraft and air base support. The Air Force will, however, become an indispensable player in theater logistics because it possesses the required APODs and airlift for the Theater Distribution System. As for the Naval forces' Seabased Logistics, its primary limitations are its logistics reach (less than 200 miles inland) and lack of transportation assets. If military operations remain relatively close to the littorals and do not require the movement of large amounts of bulk resources (fuel, water, munitions, etc), the Seabased Logistics structure can support theater logistics operations. However, Seabased Logistics primary role in joint theater logistics will be as a logistics force enabler, supporting maritime operations and providing additional resources to the JTLC, as required.

The TSC is the organization best suited to evolve into the JTLC for several reasons. First, the Army is building the organization with this purpose in mind. With augmentation, it can provide balanced logistics functions to support the full range of joint or multinational operations[31]. Next, its modular design allows it to provide early entry support while building up to support follow-on forces. Also, modularity allows its force structure to be tailored to the CINC's needs and is compatible with strategic lift constraints[32]. Third, it manages the Theater Distribution System (for which the Army has been designated as lead agent by JCS/J4)[33]. Fourth, it can perform split-base operations in support of strategic, operational and tactical functions. It will be the CINC's single logistics POC for synchronizing theater logistics operations[34]. Fifth, it will control all rear area operations, to include: security, NBC support, JLOTS operations, POW and

refugee affairs, infrastructure development, and procurement support[35]. Sixth, it meets the Army's Title 10 responsibilities for Wartime Executive Agent Requirements (WEAR) support to other Services[36]. Next, it has received the backing of senior Army, Air Force and Marine officers[37]. Also, it incorporates both Active and Reserve Component (AC/RC) units and personnel in concert with the military's Total Force policy. Finally, either a MGEN or LGEN will command it[38]. Should a CINC designate a TSC as his JTLC, its commander should be named the JFLOGC.

While there are many attributes in designating the TSC as the JTLC, there are some problems. First and foremost, readiness is an issue. The TSC is highly reliant upon the RC to provide the bulk of the its CSS forces. Over 70% of the Army's CSS capabilities reside in its Reserve and National Guard units[39]. In 1992, LGEN Pagonis warned against transferring more CSS missions to the Reserves. He believed some logistics functions should move back into the AC[40]. Should there be any delays in RC call-up, it is doubtful the TSC could support a large-scale contingency. Peacetime training may also be a problem due to the availability of RC forces to train with AC forces. The Army must ensure its RC CSS personnel are ready, equipped and available to meet any contingency. Second, the TSC will not adequately support Service-unique requirements. Therefore, the Services would still have to provide some organic logistics functions at the expense of supporting the TSC. The CINC may be forced to arbitrate conflicts between Service and theater support requirements. Third, the Army may not be tasked to provide the preponderance of CSS or a TSC. Being solely reliant upon the Army's TSC might mean a CINC would not have an organization to conduct theater-level logistics management. Finally, since the TSC is an Army organization, an Army

officer will always command it. Unless the CINC replaces the TSC commander, the JFLOGC will always be an Army officer, possibly creating Inter-service conflicts.

Conclusion. The best approach to managing joint theater logistics in the early 21st Century is to create a Joint Theater Logistics Command led by a Joint Force Logistics Commander. By 2010, the basis for such an organization will exist in the form of the Army's Theater Support Command. Joint Publication 4-0 lists four logistics limitations at the operational and tactical levels. These are: inadequate transportation means and port capacities; insufficient quantities of certain munitions, equipment, and spare parts; lack of trained logisticians; and failure to plan for adequate, interoperable Logistics C4 systems. These problems are not new to logisticians. They have long recognized the need for increased effectiveness and efficiency in supporting combat forces. Alleviating these shortcomings requires the expertise of dedicated individuals organized and led in a way to best meet the requirements of the joint warfighter[41]. The JTLC led by a JFLOGC provides theater CINCs the logistics management resources they need to meet their operational needs of the next century. The only questions remaining are whether or not senior military leaders recognize the problem and act on its solution?

APPENDIX A

Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, and 4-0, Doctrine for Logistics Support of Joint Operations, provides guidance to CINCs on joint logistics command and control (C2) and operations. Joint Publication 3-0 says[42]:

"Combatant commanders may exercise directive authority (or delegate it for common support capabilities) for logistics matters in their AOR. He may exercise this authority to issue directives to subordinate commanders to ensure effectiveness and economy of operations, or prevention or elimination of unnecessary duplication of facilities and overlapping functions among Service components."

It also states that logistics is key to arranging operations within campaigns and should be planned and executed as a joint responsibility.

Joint Publication 4-0 provides the following[43]:

"Implementation and execution of logistics functions remain the responsibility of the Services and Service Component Commanders (SCCs). Each service is responsible for logistics support of its own forces, except when logistics support is otherwise provided for by agreements with national agencies or allies, or by assignments to common, joint, or cross-servicing."

This Publication also outlines the following specific CINC considerations for Theater-Strategic level support[44]:

a. Logistics resources necessary to generate combat forces and sustain their operations.
b. A procurement process to ensure the availability of logistics resources in a timely manner.
c. A process of allocating available logistics resources among subordinate commands.
d. A distribution system necessary to achieve maximum combat effectiveness.

Both Publications provide the following CINC logistics responsibilities:

a. Allocating critical resources, coordinating supply support between SCCs, establishing supply buildup rates, and stating theater stockage levels[45]

b. Sustainment planning[46]

c. Exercise control over all intratheater movement[47]

d. Use of all facilities and supplies of all assigned and attached forces to accomplish the mission[48]

e. Establish priorities for service and support for each phase of a campaign[49]

f. Coordinate use of facilities, ports, rail lines, highways, and airfields in a manner that supports mission accomplishment[50]

g. Consider centralizing host-nation support functions so those requirements are both identified and supported, consistent with mission accomplishment[51]

Finally, both Publications provide some guidance on joint command. Joint Publication 3-0 states[52]:

"Unity of command is to ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander for every objective. It means all forces operate under a single commander with the requisite authority to direct all forces employed in pursuit of a common purpose. Unity of effort requires coordination and cooperation among all forces toward a commonly recognized objective, although they are not necessarily part of the same command structure. Unity of effort compliments unity of command."

On command of logistics, Joint Publication 4-0 says:

"Logistics is a function of command. To have control over the strategic, operational and tactical levels of war, one must have control over logistics. For a given area or mission, a single command authority should be responsible for logistics." [53]

"The logistics support system must be in harmony with the structure and employment of the combat forces it supports. This unity of effort is best attained under a single command authority." [54]

Joint Publication 4-0 lists four logistics limitations at the operational and tactical levels. These are: inadequate transportation means and port capacities; insufficient quantities of certain munitions, equipment, and spare parts; lack of trained logisticians; and failure to plan for adequate, interoperable Logistics C4 systems[55].

ENDNOTES

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38 Ibid.
39 JMO Army briefing, 15 December 1998
40 Pagonis, Moving Mountains, 102 and 208-209
41 GEN Schwarzkopf recognized early in the planning for the Gulf War his need for a theater logistics commander. This is why he named LGEN (then MGEN) Pagonis to lead the logistics effort. Eventually, LGEN Pagonis had enough troops under his control to have the 22nd Support Command created, in effect the first TSC.
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ACRONYMS

AC	Active Component
ACC	Air Combat Command
AEF	Aerospace Expeditionary Force
AFIT	Air Force Institute of Technology
AFLMA	Air Force Logistics Management Agency
AMX	Air Mobility Express
AOR	Area of Responsibility
APOD	Aerial Port of Debarkation
ARG	Amphibious Ready Group
BD	Battlefield Distribution
BRAC	Base Realignment and Closure
C2	Command and Control
C4ISR	Command, Control, Communication, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance
CASCOM	U.S. Army Combined Arms Support Command
CINC	Commander in Chief
CONOPS	Concept of Operations
CSS	Combat Service Support
CVBG	Carrier Battle Group
DECA	Defense Commissary Agency
DFAS	Defense Finance and Accounting Service
DFSC	Defense Fuels Support Center
DISA	Defense Information Systems Agency
DLA	Defense Logistics Agency
DOD	Department of Defense
EAC	Echelon Above Corps
EFX	Expeditionary Force Experiment/Exercise
GCSS	Global Combat Support System
HQ	Headquarters
IAW	In Accordance With
ITV	In-transit Visibility
J4	Logistics Staff
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JFACC	Joint Force Air Component Commander

ACRONYMS

JFLCC	Joint Force Land Component Commander
JFLOGC	Joint Force Logistics Commander
JFMCC	Joint Force Maritime Component Commander
JLOTS	Joint Logistics-Over-the-Shore
JTAV	Joint Total Asset Visibility
JTF	Joint Tactical Fighter
JTLC	Joint Theater Logistics Command
LOGCAP	Logistics Civilian Augmentation Program
LOTS	Logistics-Over-the-Shore
MPF	Maritime Preposition Force
NBC	Nuclear, Biological, Chemical
NGA	Non-Governmental Agency
OMFTS	Operational Maneuvers from the Sea
POC	Point of Contact
POW	Prisoner of War
PVO	Private Volunteer Organization
RC	Reserve Component
SCC	Service Component Commander
SPOD	Sea Port of Debarkation
STOM	Ship to Objective Maneuver
TAACOM	Theater Army Area Command
TAMMC	Theater Army Materiel Management Command
TPFDD	Time Phased Force Deployment Data
TRADOC	U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
TSC	Theater Support Command
TTP	Tactics, Techniques, Procedures
UN	United Nations
USAC&GSC	U.S. Army Command & General Staff College
USAWC	U.S. Army War College
WEAR	Wartime Executive Agency Requirements

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